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Abstract (100 – 120 words) 
Transparency is increasingly evoked within public and private climate governance 
arrangements as a key means to enhance accountability and improve environmental outcomes. 
We review assumed links between transparency, accountability and environmental 
sustainability here, by identifying four rationales underpinning uptake of transparency in 
governance. We label these democratization, technocratization, marketization and 
privatization, and assess how they shape the scope and practices of climate disclosure, and to 
what effect. We find that all four are discernible in climate governance, yet the technocratic 
and privatization rationales tend to overtake the originally intended (more inclusive, and more 
public-good oriented) democratization and marketization rationales for transparency, 
particularly during institutionalization of disclosure systems. This reduces transparency’s 
potential to enhance accountability or trigger more environmentally sustainable outcomes.  
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Introduction: A Transparency Turn in Climate Governance  
Transparency is subject to growing social science scrutiny as an increasingly 
important mechanism of global sustainability governance and politics [1–5, 51*]. In this 
article, we review recent scholarship on the nature and consequences of a transparency turn in 
global climate governance. We take as our point of departure the etymological meaning of 
transparency as “seeing through” or making visible [45], and assess the politics of what is to 
be made visible, for whom and why in global climate governance. In so doing, we look at the 
role that targeted, intentional (voluntary and mandatory) disclosure is playing in the climate 
realm. A variety of public and private climate governance arrangements, including, inter alia, 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP), now call for transparency as a way to monitor and/or reward 
various actors’ climate mitigation actions and performance. Such “governance by disclosure” 
[6] is intended to further a variety of goals, including holding disclosers to account and 
improving sustainability performance [11**, see also 47, 48]. Yet whether transparency is 
able to deliver on such promises remains unevenly examined, particularly in the climate 
realm.  
The prospect of climate transparency is linked to the increasingly heterogeneous and 
fragmented nature of climate governance—encompassing multilaterally negotiated treaties, 
transnational municipal networks, subnational actors, bilateral agreements, and voluntary 
corporate initiatives [7-10, 50]. In such contexts, the demand and supply of transparency 
becomes multi-directional, flowing from and to a wide array of state and non-state actors, as 
well as consumers and citizens, rather than only from governments to interested publics. As 
such, the rationales for furthering transparency, and the governance benefits to be derived 
from disclosure, necessarily also vary, and may even be contrary to each other. 
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Many analysts of transparency begin with an optimistic view of its promise, only to 
subsequently highlight various perils in relying on disclosure in the quest for greater 
accountability and sustainability [12, 13, 31, 52]. Where transparency fails to achieve its aims, 
scholars point to a range of explanations. These include inadequate design of disclosure, such 
as the means by which information is to be disclosed (whether electronic or otherwise); the 
attributes of information disclosed, such as whether it is standardized, accurate, and 
comprehensible [14*]; or else the quantity of disclosed information (whether complete or 
partial) [15*]. Certainly, more disclosure is not always or necessarily better, given that the 
empowering potential of transparency can rapidly be eroded if excessive or irrelevant 
information overwhelms recipients and results in a “drowning in disclosure” [6, see also 46*]. 
Furthermore, in light of ever-greater flows of information, newly emerging intermediaries of 
transparency—auditors, verifiers, and certifiers of disclosed information—are becoming ever 
more important. These intermediaries constitute powerful new actors, with the potential to 
shape the impact of transparency in sustainability governance [16, 49].  
While these aspects of a transparency turn are increasingly the subject of scholarly 
attention, we contextualize such analyses here by systematically assessing the broader context 
shaping the uptake of disclosure in sustainability governance. In particular, we identify four 
distinct (but potentially overlapping) rationales that, we posit, are driving a transparency turn 
in global environmental and sustainability governance. We label these democratization, 
technocratization, marketization, and privatization, and assess whether they are discernible in 
public and private climate governance initiatives. If so, how do they interact with each other, 
which ones dominate, and to what effect? Such questions remain both timely and little 
addressed. We turn next to elaborating further on the four rationales, and then reviewing 
whether and how they shape the scope and practices of climate disclosure. We do so through 
examining transparency arrangements in both state-led and private climate governance 
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arrangements. These include the multilateral climate negotiations under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); the Carbon Disclosure Project, as 
one of the most prominent voluntary corporate carbon disclosure initiatives; and disclosure 
arrangements in (voluntary) carbon offset markets. In concluding, we draw on our discussion 
to (re-) assess the multifaceted nature of a transparency turn in climate governance, and its 
consequences for securing more accountable and environmentally sustainable outcomes.  
Box 1: Glossary of key terms 
UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNFCCC is the leading multilateral treaty addressing climate change, now in 
force for more than 20 years (since 1994). It has been ratified by 195 countries. 
http://unfccc.int/2860.php 
KP: Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol is a sub-treaty under the UNFCCC that lays down 
mandatory emission reduction targets for so-called Annex 1 (i.e. developed) 
countries, for the period 2008-2012.  
CDM: Clean Development Mechanism 
The CDM is one of the three “flexibility mechanisms” in the UNFCCC’s Kyoto 
Protocol. The CDM allows developed countries to support emission-reduction 
projects in developing countries, and count the reduced emissions towards their 
own emission reduction targets. https://cdm.unfccc.int/ 
CDP: Carbon Disclosure Project 
The CDP is a non-profit organization specializing in the collection and 
disclosure of self-reported information about climate change, water and forest-
risk date. https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Pages/HomePage.aspx 
REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in 
developing countries 
REDD+ is a mechanism under UNFCCC whereby developed countries can 
financially support developing countries to reduce emissions from forested 
lands and invest in low-carbon development. http://redd.unfccc.int/ 
Why Transparency: Diverse Rationales for Disclosure 
As we noted above, transparency is often invoked to further a variety of governance 
aims, given the multiple architects of “governance by disclosure” in a global sustainability 
context. Thus, public actors might promote transparency to enhance accountability, informed 
choice, and/or informed participation of citizens or states (i.e. what we call a democratization 
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imperative for disclosure). They might also promote transparency, however, as a key means to 
rationalize and improve decision-making, through reducing information asymmetries and/or 
requiring expert-driven, technical information to underpin “sound scientific” decision-making 
(what we refer to here as a technocratization imperative for disclosure). On the other hand, 
private actors might voluntarily embrace transparency to further corporate sustainability 
goals, improve their public image, and/or avoid more stringent government regulation (a 
privatization imperative driving disclosure). Both public and private actors might also do so, 
furthermore, to facilitate the creation, functioning, and expansion of markets for 
environmental goods, or for performance-based compensation (a marketization impetus for 
disclosure).  
These four rationales embody different logics of environmental governance, which 
reflect in turn wider processes of economic globalization and global environmental politics. 
The marketization and privatization rationales are often aligned with globally hegemonic 
(neoliberal) discourses privileging market-based solutions, economic valuation of 
environmental goods and services, and an enhanced role for private authority in global 
environmental governance. For climate governance, this may mean interpreting transparency 
and disclosure in terms of the information entitlements and needs primarily of market-based 
actors (e.g. the climate risk disclosure rules of the US Securities and Exchange Commission). 
Market-relevant transparency can and is solicited from both public and private actors, as well 
as individual citizens (e.g. personal carbon budgeting or offsetting).  
Use of a marketization rationale can also be consistent with state-based, multilaterally 
negotiated governance architectures—as with disclosure requirements underpinning the 
smooth functioning of market-based flexibility mechanisms, such as the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) within the UNFCCC. The shift from marketization to privatization as an 
important imperative for disclosure refers, however, to governance systems where private 
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authority permeates all aspects of the disclosure and use of sustainability-related information. 
In climate governance, this might be reflected in the CDP, wherein the principal rationale for 
carbon disclosure is to assist private investment decisions, despite an initial expectation that 
civil society actors would use voluntarily disclosed corporate emissions data to make 
accountability claims against disclosers and/or compare their sustainability performance.  
While the two rationales of marketization and privatization as rationales for disclosure 
share a preference for private authority, there remains a tension between them over the 
legitimate reach of this authority in sustainability governance. In the case of climate 
governance, a marketization rationale, with its functional benefits in terms of the open and 
efficient transfer of climate information, may be employed to serve a public good of climate 
transparency. However, by deepening disclosure obligations in the domains of voluntary 
governance and private authority, the privatization of climate governance may displace, and 
crowd out, the development of  public legal obligations (both nationally and internationally) 
on the disclosure of relevant climate information. Instead, a privatization of climate 
transparency can signify deference to overriding norms of market valuation for private gain or 
protection of commercial confidentiality. 
The democratization and technocratization rationales typically emerge from public 
actors, but are also supported by civil society actors, notably environmental and development 
NGOs. In the climate governance realm, a democratization imperative for transparency is 
often closely associated with state-based governance, whether national or international. 
Democratization imperatives linking transparency to a right to know, to exercise informed 
choice, demand accountability, and/or promote informed participation, tend to be strongest in 
liberal democracies [51:6], though even here climate transparency can be crowded out by 
countervailing sectional interests (e.g. fossil fuel lobbies) and state priorities (economic 
growth).  
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In an international context, as with other global environmental treaties, the penetration 
of climate transparency in the UNFCCC reflects wider transparency norms in public 
international law (e.g. prior notification), but is also constrained by the rules of voluntary 
consent and unanimity: UNFCCC parties must agree on their own rules of transparency, 
including those parties with non-democratic domestic regimes. This notwithstanding, a 
democratization rationale for disclosure is intended, in this context, to further the 
accountability of disclosers (primarily other states, but also private actors) and permit more 
open scrutiny of diverse states’ engagement with, and burden sharing for, climate actions and 
support. At the same time, a technocratic rationale for transparency may also be discernible in 
this context, whereby a bureaucratic, expert-driven focus on design of adequate disclosure 
systems, particularly during the institutionalization of transparency arrangements, might serve 
to sideline or supersede an (original) democratization and accountability imperative for 
disclosure.  
The technocratic rationale for transparency also plays a part in private climate 
governance systems. Indeed, as we elaborate further below, it has recently acquired increasing 
importance in carbon offset markets—particularly voluntary markets—in the wake of high-
profile carbon fraud and widely acknowledged deficits in the credibility of carbon offset 
information. As such, a technocratization of (private) climate transparency is feasible, through 
development of elaborate systems of professional auditing and certification; or in response to 
accelerating technological gains and interconnected information and communication systems 
as they pertain to widespread release and use of climate data. These developments may also 
be compatible with a democratization rationale for disclosure, however, insofar as they allow 
for more inclusive and open production of relevant climate information by non-experts. 
We turn next to assessing the extent to which these four rationales are driving uptake 
of transparency in climate governance, and the potential interlinkages between them.  Figure 1 
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presents an overview of the four rationales for transparency’s uptake discussed above. The 
figure highlights their dynamic character as well, with the arrows signifying the potential to 
shift from one to another during the institutionalization of specific disclosure initiatives, 
resulting in distinct governance effects from those originally anticipated.  We return in our 
conclusion to the implications of this dynamic element (whereby some rationales might 
supersede others in the course of implementing disclosure-based governance).  
 
Figure 1: Rationales for transparency’s uptake in sustainability governance 
 
Source: by authors. 
Climate Transparency: Diverse Rationales and Their Effects 
We turn here to whether and how these rationales manifest themselves in public and 
private disclosure-based climate governance arrangements, and to what effect.  
Transparency in the UNFCCC: technocratization trumps democratization and marketization? 
Transparency is increasingly at the heart of negotiations within the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), ostensibly as an important means to 
enhance accountability (and thereby presumably also the effectiveness) of climate mitigation 
Democratization 
- disclosure to enhance a right 
to know, accountability, 
choice, and participation 
Marketization 
- disclosure to ascribe economic 
value to environmental services, 
compensate for performance, or 
facilitate market exchanges  
Technocratization 
-disclosure of (expert-led 
scientific) information, to 
rationalize decision-making 
Privatization 
- (restricted) disclosure to 
augment private gain and the 
reach and power of private 
authority 
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actions. This overarching democratization rationale for transparency can be traced back to the 
2007 UNFCCC climate conference in Bali, where it was agreed that climate-related 
“commitments, actions and support” of all Parties were to be “measurable, reportable, and 
verifiable” (MRV) [17:3]. The 2007 Bali call for “transparency of actions and support” 
pertains to the current, pre-2020 phase of UNFCCC climate action, yet it has implications for 
transparency requirements in a post-2020 climate agreement, now being negotiated within the 
UNFCCC [for a discussion of these negotiations, see 18].  
Contested negotiations over the scope, reach and architecture of these pre-2020 
transparency systems came to a head, and almost derailed, the 2009 Copenhagen climate 
conference. A key conflict turned on the US demand for international verification of 
domestic, voluntarily undertaken, mitigation actions of developing countries, with China 
opposing this as an infringement of national sovereignty [19, 20]. Negotiations were 
characterized by a strong push from developing countries to maintain differentiation in design 
and stringency of MRV systems between industrialized countries, with binding mitigation 
obligations under the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol (so-called Annex I countries), and (non-
Annex 1) developing countries. Transparency arrangements agreed at the subsequent 2010 
Cancun climate meeting thus mandated two distinct MRV processes. These included, first, a 
process of “International Assessment and Review (IAR)” of climate mitigation actions 
reported by Annex 1 countries, to be undertaken by UNFCCC designated international 
experts. For the voluntary actions of non-Annex I countries, a process of “International 
Consultation and Analysis (ICA)” was agreed as a means to “increase transparency of 
mitigation actions and their effects” [21: paras 44 and 63].  
The IAR and ICA processes have clear differences in terms of scope and timeframes 
for disclosure (with the former requiring more comprehensive and more frequent reporting 
from Annex I countries) [for details, see 22]. This ongoing institutionalization of 
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(differentiated) transparency systems within the UNFCCC’s current climate regime is driven, 
as we noted above, by an original democratization rationale, insofar as the aim is to render 
visible the actions of all and to hold Annex I countries accountable for meeting mandatory 
climate mitigation obligations in the pre-2020 phase (both in terms of actions and support).  
It is also worth noting that, in specific areas of UNFCCC action such as reducing 
emissions from forest-related activities (so-called REDD+), the rationales underpinning MRV 
systems go beyond such a democratization imperative. REDD+ is a financial mechanism to 
compensate developing countries for reducing forest-related emissions. As such, it embodies a 
“payment for ecosystems services” approach to climate governance, with transparency 
required as a precondition to receive compensation for reduced emissions or to permit 
offsetting of emissions [23, 24*]. Here, a marketization rationale thus underpins disclosure as 
well [25]. Furthermore, the compensation and/or offsetting is to occur between developed and 
developing countries, with the former compensating the latter for results-based performance 
in reducing forest-related emissions. As a result, in contrast to the more general IAR/ICA 
process, developing countries are required to establish mandatory (and relatively stringent) 
MRV systems in the case of REDD+. Establishing such transparency systems is, moreover, a 
precondition for (inclusive) participation of developing countries in REDD+. 
Both the democratization and marketization rationales underlying UNFCCC MRV 
systems (whether voluntary or mandatory) have generated conflict, as evident in the 
institutionalization phases of these transparency systems. A particularly contentious issue has 
been the verification of reported actions, given that such verification can impinge upon 
national sovereignty and/or recast governance authority away from (some) states to 
“international experts” or other non-state actors [26]. As such, the design and execution of 
such systems of transparency become, simultaneously, sites of conflict and negotiation over 
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who bears foremost responsibility for taking action on climate change, and as such, who 
should be held accountable to whom, and for what. 
This is evident, for example, in debates since 2010 on the modalities of the ICA 
process for developing countries, including the imperative for it to be “non-intrusive, non-
punitive and respectful of national sovereignty”, while also being cost-effective and within 
reach of all countries [21: para 63]. A key question here is whether international (i.e. third 
party) “consultation and analysis” relating to voluntary actions of developing countries 
hastens the dismantling of the so-called “fire-wall” between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 
countries established in the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol for the pre-2020 period, with regard 
to binding emission reduction obligations. Some see the ICA as having the potential to 
undermine the UNFCCC principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” in taking 
action on climate change, insofar as it might result in “a de facto binding regime [for all], as 
countries’ domestic targets would be verified and progress reported internationally” [27, 
italics added]. As such, the design of such systems reflects broader political conflicts over 
(differentiated) responsibilities for taking action on climate change in the UNFCCC context.  
Even as this is the case, a technocratic impulse for disclosure is also becoming 
discernible in this context, particularly in the implementation phase of such MRV systems, 
wherein an expert-led, problem-solving approach tends to come to the fore. In 
institutionalizing the ICA (a process now getting underway), the focus may be shifting from 
contentious questions around the scope and verification to ensuring the adequate set-up and 
functioning of such systems, often through a focus on redressing capacity constraints or gaps 
in data availability. While the capacity constraints in developing countries are real, a 
technocratic imperative coming to the fore during institutionalization of current MRV systems 
may serve to shift attention to securing transparency from those less able to immediately 
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deliver it, i.e. capacity-constrained developing countries (yet also those with the fewest 
obligations to mitigate climate change in this multilateral context). 
Somewhat similar debates are evident in relation to REDD+ MRV systems, wherein 
forests in developing countries are conceptualized as providing the ecosystem service of 
carbon sinks, with a carbon mitigation potential that can be measured, valorized, 
compensated, and/or marketed [28]. Such valorization is to occur at the national level, with 
states required to establish national-level REDD+ MRV systems, with varying degrees of 
national flexibility permitted with regard to divergence in scope, techniques, and data sources 
[25, 26, 29]. While the 2010 Cancun agreements noted that developing country REDD+ MRV 
systems should be “available and suitable for review as agreed by the conference of the 
parties” [70], an “independent review” of REDD+ MRV nonetheless remains a high-level 
political conflict over potential infringements of national sovereignty [26,30]. This became 
evident in the standoff between Norway (a key financier of REDD+) and Brazil, and the near 
collapse of REDD+ negotiations, at the Doha climate meeting in 2012 [53]. As stated then by 
Luiz Alberto Figueiredo, Brazil's under-secretary for environment, “No developing country 
will have international verification of its actions, especially if they are national policies” [53]. 
Such disputes underscore the political significance of REDD+ MRV systems, even as 
attention has now shifted to building capacity to monitor and report on forest carbon fluxes in 
developing countries (a technocratic impulse for MRV). The technical complexity of these 
systems simultaneously validates a call for capacity building as essential to secure the more 
inclusive participation of developing countries in REDD+, but also promotes an expert-driven 
institutionalization process that can be exclusionary, insofar as it reduces the prospects to 
debate the political implications of the choices being made. Furthermore, these mandatory 
REDD+ MRV systems are also perceived by developing countries as more stringent in their 
requirements than those that Annex 1 countries are required to rely upon in accounting for 
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their own land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) emissions (in the UNFCCC 
Kyoto Protocol context) [28]. This again implies a shifting burden of transparency to those 
less able to institutionalize MRV systems, also in the REDD+ context, with consequences for 
the purposed links between transparency, accountability and environmental effectiveness. 
In sum, the discussion above highlights that the effectiveness of transparency as a way 
to secure more broad-based accountability of global climate actions (a democratization 
imperative) can only be considered in tandem with broader, contested, questions of who is to 
be held to account to whom in the first instance. While a marketization rationale for 
disclosure relates purportedly to a narrower, functional concern with compensating or 
offsetting emission reductions, this imperative for disclosure also reflects ongoing conflicts 
over the stringency and political reach of such MRV systems. Furthermore, in both instances, 
a technocratic approach to disclosure appears to gain ascendancy during institutionalization, 
which may further reduce the prospects for transparency to enhance accountability and 
improve sustainability. 
Transparency in the CDP: does privatization trumps democratization?  
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is the most significant voluntary mechanism advancing 
disclosure of corporate greenhouse gas emissions, energy use and exposure to deforestation 
risks. Founded in 2001, the CDP represents institutional investors holding, by 2014, $95 
trillion of assets [32]. The CDP advances disclosure-based climate transparency, eliciting, 
through an annual questionnaire, information on climate-related risks and opportunities: by 
2014 over 5000 companies responded to the 2014 questionnaire [32]. Individual public 
responses to the questionnaire are available on the CDP website, although CDP investor 
members can benefit from advanced comparative analysis of reported data. Environmental 
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governance research has often examined the CDP as a leading example of private authority-
led transparency [33–35, 10].  
The democratization rationale—as the “right to know”—is prominent in CDP self-
representations of climate transparency, though the principal addressees of the information are 
institutional investors. Civil society use of CDP data is compromised by differential access to 
information: enhanced access to CDP data and analytics lies behind a membership paywall, 
while data comparability is limited across the questionnaires submitted by companies 
[33:216]. This limits the public accountability reach of CDP transparency, but is compatible 
with a private authority transparency system in which information is commodified and 
otherwise diluted by (neoliberal) marketization norms (e.g. lack of sanctions for non-
compliance). CDP champions also a technocratization of climate information disclosure and 
use, focusing on managerial processes and financial auditing: this defers to a business 
argument that climate change governance is a matter of correcting information asymmetries 
and providing full information to investors, rather than recasting corporate responsibilities for 
climate risk and harm [35, 36]. 
It is not surprising then, that there is little evidence about the environmental 
effectiveness of the CDP and other corporate carbon disclosure systems, as major 
corporations do not appear to be shifting core product or marketing strategies in a low-carbon 
direction [33, 37*]. As other studies of voluntary reporting, such as the Global Reporting 
Initiative show [14*], despite vast quantities of data available through ever more extensive 
corporate reporting, the lack of specificity and comparability prevents both holding to account 
or any meaningful assessment of environmental performance patterns. The monitoring and 
analysis of environmental outcomes by voluntary disclosure systems is thus still in its infancy 
[11**].  
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Transparency in carbon offset markets: does privatization trumps marketization? 
Carbon offset markets reflect the dominance in climate transparency of both 
marketization and privatization rationales. For regulated carbon markets associated with the 
UN climate regime, the marketization of climate information is situated within, and designed 
to serve, a state-based governance framework, while the voluntary carbon markets operate 
within an external, privatized governance domain. However, the two systems are increasingly 
interlinked, increasing the commodification of climate transparency, yet in a manner aligned 
with the interests of private actors. Thus, voluntary markets mirror, and anticipate 
strategically, the future direction of compliance markets.  Without the state-centred, 
centralized structure of the latter, voluntary markets have multiple mechanisms for issuing 
credits, competing quality standards and disparate, individualized contracts. As these are 
private sector mechanisms, there is a lack of public transparency about their content and 
reach [10, 38]. A contradiction arises here, insofar as the business case for voluntary carbon 
offsets is that they reduce financial risks (e.g. legal and reputational risks) that may derive 
from information deficits regarding corporate climate liabilities. At the same time, economic 
returns for offset traders rely on securing private, proprietary access to important climate risk 
information within and across business sectors [36]. 
A democratization rationale for climate transparency also underlies the original 
creation of voluntary carbon markets, with environmentalists and investors viewing the public 
transparency of greenhouse gas emissions and emissions trading as instrumental to progress in 
climate mitigation. Yet this democratic rationale for disclosing corporate emissions-related 
information has been overtaken by the privatization rationale, affecting the institutional 
development of climate transparency. Since 2005, private enterprises have overtaken non-
profit organizations as the main source of investment in voluntary carbon markets [39], and 
carbon market trading associations (e.g. the International Carbon Reduction and Offset 
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Alliance) are realigning climate transparency according to an agenda of corporate self-
regulation, although, as with the CDP, a technocratic rationale is also used to justify this shift. 
For Paterson, the displacement of NGO-led carbon certification standards by industry-led 
schemes suggests a “corporate capture of the verification process” [8:249].  
To be sure, these private and voluntary mechanisms have limited governance currency 
compared to (state-regulated) compliance carbon markets: despite their rapid recent growth, 
by 2013 voluntary carbon markets were worth only $379 million of an estimated $41 billion 
trading in global carbon markets [40]. However, their transparency norms and practices 
significantly shape the role of private authority in tackling climate change, and interact with 
state-centred emissions markets. The voluntary monetization of emissions reductions often 
derives from pre-registered and even rejected CDM projects. The opacity of the voluntary 
markets has created a high level of fraud, contributing, it is claimed, to a recent decline in the 
value of emission reductions (both voluntary and mandatory) [41]. According to INTERPOL, 
the lack of transparency of the voluntary carbon markets invites the fraudulent manipulation 
of information [42; see also 43, 44].  
In an effort to increase transparency in mandatory carbon trading, in 2014 the CDM 
Executive Board launched an initiative to enhance transparency of credits for certified 
emissions reductions through a voluntary questionnaire on sustainable development benefits. 
This desire to reassure participants in compliance carbon markets characterized by falling 
demand and low prices attested to the failure of the climate offset sector to instil trust in its 
governance mechanisms: the privatized transparency of voluntary carbon offsets has 
exacerbated the concerns of civil society actors, and many states, over the credibility of 
carbon markets. The erosion of the early democratization imperative for public transparency, 
in favour of more privatized and exclusionary disclosure arrangements, has unsettled the 
legitimacy of carbon trading and, more generally, of global climate governance.  
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Conclusion 
Our review has examined transparency’s uptake and effects in climate governance, 
according to four overlapping rationales for disclosure —democratization, marketization, 
technocratization and privatization. Our findings suggest, most broadly, that the effects of 
climate transparency are inextricably linked to political and normative disagreements about 
the diverse goals of disclosure, which reflect, in turn, divergent views of whose actions should 
be made transparent, by whom, and to what end. This ensures that disclosure is itself a site of 
contestation, rather than a (neutral) means to help transcend political conflicts. 
Figure 2 illustrates how the public and private climate governance arrangements 
examined here occupy particular zones of (dynamic) overlap between diverse rationales for 
disclosure. We find that these rationales permeate the heterogeneous and fragmented nature of 
climate governance: their political currency and inter-relationships, as briefly explored in this 
review, shape the transparency turn in climate governance. Furthermore, these rationales for 
disclosure are not always associated with straightforward, binary ascriptions of public and 
private authority. Thus, while the democratization and technocratization rationales have 
principally emerged from public actors, supported by civil society organizations, and reflect 
state-centred transparency norms, the disclosure of climate information in private governance 
mechanisms (e.g. voluntary carbon markets) is also driven by democratic norms of public 
transparency. The increasing professionalization and specialization of climate transparency 
has, however, seen democratizing imperatives blunted by rationalist managerial norms of 
technocratization, in which even climate information presented as “public” is restricted or 
rendered opaque to outsiders by the managerial and financial auditing interests of subscribing 
organizations (e.g. Carbon Disclosure Project) or the scientific and technical experts 
negotiating REDD+ MRV systems. 
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Figure 2: Transparency’s competing rationales in climate governance 
 
 
Source: authors. 
Along with democratization, an original impetus for both public and private disclosure 
is a (neoliberal) privileging of market-based solutions to climate change. In the case of 
REDD+ MRV systems, such a marketization rationale for climate disclosure is consistent, as 
well, with state-based governance architecture. A shift to a more exclusionary privatization of 
climate transparency refers, however, to market-based governance architectures where private 
authority permeates all aspects of the disclosure and use of climate-related information. Thus, 
in the case of the CDP, the principal rationale for carbon disclosure is to assist private 
investment decisions, although civil society actors were originally assumed to be likely users 
of this data to make accountability claims against disclosers. While the two rationales of 
marketization and privatization may overlap, we find here that the latter often reshapes the 
former to secure a more comprehensive reach of private authority in climate governance. 
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Thus, a growing privatization and technocratization of climate transparency is evident 
in the disclosure initiatives examined here. This compromises the transformative potential of 
transparency, particularly as a mechanism for enhancing public accountability of those 
generating substantial or otherwise disproportionate greenhouse gas emissions. The more 
information on climate risk is appropriated as a private good—as in the evolution of carbon 
markets—the less likely it is that affected parties can participate in decision-making about the 
desirability or direction of climate governance choices. There is, furthermore, little sign that 
voluntary carbon disclosure systems are shifting production and investment strategies of 
corporations in a low-carbon, i.e. more sustainable, direction.  
In multilateral climate governance, the prospect for greater transparency to enhance 
accountability remains inextricably tied to strong geopolitical disagreements over equity of 
action and burden sharing to mitigate climate change (with concurrently reduced prospects to 
stimulate ambitious climate action through disclosure alone). Such politically contested issues 
are often deflected, in the implementation phase, into a (seemingly apolitical) technocratic 
focus on building bureaucratic capacities, in order to enhance the scope and “soundness” of 
disclosed information as a means to rationalize decisions. Yet such technocratization (and 
privatization) imperatives run the risk of undermining the democratization and marketization 
rationales that initially underpinned the examined disclosure initiatives.  
In sum, we identify here, across both private and public domains of authority, a turn 
away from transparency’s more public-good oriented aims of enhanced accountability and 
improved environmental outcomes, particularly in the practice of global climate governance. 
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